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1. Bias, argumentation and objectivity 
 
The 11 OSSA proposed papers to discuss different kinds of bias in argumentation domain. For 
this reason, we proposed a short case study that shows, in a polylogical perspective, magistrates 
making unanimous decision based in subjective criteria, beyond strictly legal arguments. In The 
broken leg case, in which we analyze argumentation in legal context, effectively the most 
important aspect to point out is the implicit motivations and biases that inspired the group of 
magistrates (that is, the collective ethos) in the moment of finding the amount to be payed as 
moral damage.  
Thereby, showing that a deliberation presents “slices of negotiation”, when judges need 
to evaluate ways to refund moral damages in a kind of non-strictly logic calculation, was just a 
way to describe that context of judgment in a specific Brazilian Court, even if that was not the 
most relevant point of analysis in that discourse-in-interaction presented. In reality, we did intend 
to focus on the subjective aspect of the polylogical interaction, as a way to demonstrate that “not 
all bias is bad bias” (Walton 1992, p. 257); on the contrary, that is even normal, as assert jurists 
like Atienza (1997; 2003), Perelman (1999), Cornu (2005) and Ghirardi (1999). 
This way, the technical subtleties between deliberation’s and negotiation’s concept, when 
magistrates try to use their mathematic skills in a dialectic and dialogical way in the moments 
that they tried to find the more reasonable amount (suum cuique tribuere) to compensate a moral 
damage, do really not belonged to the inner scope of the presented paper. That is due to the fact 
that, in the brief presentation of the extracted data, we just wanted to point out that in a legal 
domain it is not unusual the intertwining of technical and value arguments, where the 
subjectivity plays a prominent role, defeating the mythical legal objectivity, as we will try to 
reinforce here. 
 
2. Negotiation is embedded in deliberation 
 
As Posner says (2008, p. 85), “judgement is a matter of deliberation - not necessarily collective.” 
In that way, ‘The broken leg case’ tried to describe the moment that magistrates deliberate to 
define the amount to be paid (pretium doloris) by one of the parts of a legal process (defendant 
or plaintiff). In that context, we considered deliberation a diversified genre of interactional 
activity in which magistrates are motivated to critically examine if a fact would or not be 
considered a moral damage. 
The analysis of “TRIBUNAL corpus” allowed us to recognize important characteristics 
of moral damage´s judgements, in some Brazilian courts. In that way, the moment that 
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magistrates dialogue to decide the appropriate amount to each case was described as a kind of 
‘bargain’, simply because in that moment of deliberations they must decide the most appropriate 
offer to the case under consideration. Even if in the analyzed case magistrates effectively do not 
serve their self-interests or look for a personal satisfying solution, they are serving the Justice’s 
interests, personified in the plaintiff and the defendant’s proceedings.  
Moreover, why would we not negotiate/bargain in name of others, without seeking 
particular interests? In this moment, I wonder about members of stock exchanges bargaining the 
best indicators for example. In this kind of situation, stockbrokers do not negotiate in their own 
names, but in the name of the enterprise that they represent. In this sense, The broken leg case 
showed magistrates trying to strike a good deal in the name of the Justice, in the very specific 
moment of the definition/evaluation of the amount to be payed as a moral damage. That kind of 
magistrate’s action is what we recognized as a kind of negotiation. 
This way, although negotiation is embedded in deliberation, in the second step of 
judgements about moral damage (the first step is to decide if an action would be considered a 
licit act or a moral damage), in the paper we had not the aim to deeply discuss that dichotomy 
(negotiation versus deliberation). Moreover, “since negotiation and deliberation share important 
features – both are collective decision-making procedures centered on the practical question 
‘what to do’ – they can be easily confused during the process of analyzing actual fragments of 
discourse” (Ihnen, p. 598). Probably this overlap of characteristics between ‘deliberation’ and 
‘negotiation’ has led Ms Carozza to ask for clarification about the difference between these 
terms, what seems reasonable, even if that was not the objective of our proposition. 
In the domain of ethnometodological studies, territory from where our work took some 
theoretical contributions, analysts of polylogal interactions are prudent to define precisely what a 
negotiation is. In Kerbrat-Orecchionni’s work (2002; 2011), for example, we see that, in the 
domain of discours-in-interaction, the notion of negotiation may be very polemical sometimes. 
In this way, and to sum up, in our analysis, we called “negotiation” moments that judges speak 
openly about money, amounts (pretium doloris), trying to establish criteria to define prices (the 
called suum cuique tribuere), accepting or refusing “offers” suggested by another magistrate, 
during deliberations. Although magistrates do not make personal deals or defend self-interests, in 
the sense used in Walton’s dialogues or classical principled negotiation, the case presented 
shows a moment of negotiation embedded in deliberation, in the sense we that just tried to 
elucidate. 
 
3. Emotional reasoning in unanimous decision 
 
It is clear that the kind of reflection made by magistrates in the moment to find the criteria to 
justify the amount to be payed (“°it is reasonable/°”/l. 30-32) would be applied to a group of 
magistrates or a single one. The combination of rational and emotional reasoning can occur 
easily without the presence of the second and third judge, as Ms Carozza perfectly argues. We 
did not intend to show the contrary.  
In fact, what we proposed to stress in the analysis presented is that in a deliberative 
model, the participation of all members of the Court in every case is important not only because 
the magistrates are assumed in that model to be open to persuasion, but also because each may be 
able to contribute to “making the opinion in even a unanimous decision the best that it can be” 
(Posner, p. 303). 
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Thus, we tried to demonstrate that the exteriorization of the foro interno allows the group 
of magistrates share biases that strengthen the collective ethos (Amossy, p. 160). In that way, the 
choice of the criterion to measure the amount to be paid as a moral damage in that specific case 
indicates a connection between external and self-deliberation. 
When the three members choose the same subjective criterion to evaluate a moral 
damage, that demonstrates a collective bias. In that case, unanimity is a remarkable way to 
making a decision the best that it can be, in addition to be a strong way to make justice voice 
speak louder. 
 
4. Sentiments and other kinds of justice 
  
The most important point in the paper presented was to demonstrate how difficult would be to 
magistrates to have a list of amounts to help them to find criteria to define monetary values to 
diverse degrees of moral damages. The very moment in which judges deliberate about the 
criterion to be used in The broken leg case based in the intensity of the guard’s physical pain is a 
subjective way to judge (“=°it was only the leg\ poo:r man he: had a violent pain\ you see when 
he was atta-cked – but you know\”° /l. 33-35). This excerpt illustrates that, in judging, 
magistrates may not talk about truth, but about sentiments, sensations, emotions and other kind 
of bias. 
The difficult to value the amount of a moral damage oblige magistrates to find criteria not 
completely objective. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, not all bias is bad bias. This way, 
the case showed that some aspects of law and legal reasoning would not be reduced to the 
interpretation of codes, decrees, regulations or statutes. In fact, in some aspects, the juridical 
domain is simply the result of human invention, where laws exist to help people to achieve social 
goals that go beyond strict law.  
To conclude, a stronger analysis of disagreement in the moments of “bargain” and 
“negotiation” in that kind of judgement is examined in the work Le prix de la douleur: Gestion 
des désaccords entre magistrats, dans un tribunal brésilien de seconde instance/2013, a PhD 
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